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THIS late sixteenth century tract, previously unpublished, reflects the con-
fusion and difficulties of Elizabethan lawyers in explaining English equity, as
administered principally by the Chancery. The tract does not add significantly
to material already available but it faithfully reflects attitudes of the day and
certainly deserves modem publication.
Hake, the author, was a minor literary figure as well as a lawyer. In neither
phase of his activities did he make a great impression on his own time. He
was a member of Gray's Inn and presumably practiced for a time before the
central courts in London. However, much of his time and energy went into
local government in the town of Windsor. He served as mayor, was elected
a member of Parliament from Windsor in 1588, and served as steward of New
Windsor in the 1590's. In the manuscript Chancery Bills and Answers at the
Record Office, there are pleadings in a Chancery action brought by Hake in
January, 1592, seeking to be confirmed in the office of steward of New Windsor
to which the Queen had recently appointed him.1 His rival claimant, defendant
in the proceeding, charged that Hake was a "troublesome fellowe" and the
denials and countercharges of Hake suggest how deeply involved he was in the
factional strife of a small community. He maintained his connections with
prominent judges and lawyers, however, and, as indicated by the present tract,
he read fairly widely and reflected much on the baffling problems of Chancery
Equity.
Hake was only one of many at the time who sought some rational explana-
tion of the evident fact that the remedies of the Chancery were indispensable
to English society and to the functioning of the common law itself. The Chan-
cery was a very busy court. All the practicing common lawyers appeared before
it constantly. At all times they had to take account of Chancery doctrines and
of the threat of Chancery intervention in common law litigation. There were,
beside the Chancery, various satellite equity courts that applied similar doc-
trines, especially the Court of Requests whose apologist, Sir Julius Caesar, be-
friended Hake and tried to help him publish the present tract. When Hake's
manuscript was being written, the common lawyers had forged the means for
bringing the satellite courts under control and were probably considering fur-
ther measures against them. But the Chancery was a redoubt much harder to
reduce, fortified as it was by nearly 300 years of adverse possession.
Among sixteenth century discussions of equity the best known and most
influential was Doctor and Student, by St. Germain, which had been first pub-
lished in 1523 and had gone through numerous editions before Hake wrote. It
dealt of course with many specific problems in the relations between common
law and Chancery equity, though in the main the approach was broadly philo-
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sophical and one of its virtues was the access it gave to continental speculation.
Hake borrows much from St. Germain, both with and without acknowledg-
ment. He also relies heavily on Plowden's discussion of the equitable inter-
pretation of statutes, already published in an extensive note in Plowden's Re-
ports. West's Synzboleography, published in 1590, had much to say about
equity in general and something about specific applications of equity through
Chancery remedies. Crompton's Authority and Jurisdiction of Courts, pub-
lished in 1593, treated the same subjects more briefly. Thomas Ashe, a con-
temporary of Hake's in Gray's Inn, wrote a book (not published until 1609)
which employed the same title (Epicikcia) as Hake's, but which was mainly
concerned with "equitable" interpretation of statutes by common law courts.
There are in addition various other manuscripts dating from these years that
discuss the relations between the "equity" of the common law courts and the
equity of the Chancellor. Some were published later and some deserve their
present state of obscurity. But all reflect the trouble in many minds, the diffi-
culty of explaining the English solutions, and the search for a general theory
that might tie diverse phenomena together.
Hake's treatise is cast in the form of a dialogue between Hake and two other
persons named Eliott and Lovelace. Simulated dialogue was of course a favorite
form of expository writing at the time. In skillful hands, like those of St. Ger-
main, it served to bring out and emphasize basic points of conflict on seriously
debated questions. Hake's treatment makes Eliott and Lovelace not much
more than amiable stooges, whose objections are soon bowled over and whose
questions are mostly feeders for Hake. A considerable amount of filler is used
to maintain the form of a conversation. The illusion is aided further by occa-
sional wanderings in the discussion, as in Hake's ten-page argument in Dialogue
I that judges should be learned. In view of his discursiveness on this subject,
it is disappointing that Hake is so brief in his next contention that judges should
be "couragious and stowte" in resisting commands of the Queen to violate the
law. He returns to this general issue later in a brief treatment of a related
problem-the stays of litigation at the Queen's command which were common-
ly called protections. Hake starts with some bold quotations from Magna
Charta, but then rather weakly concludes that stays not authorized by law must
be explained by "the absolute power of the Prince" which he (Hake) did not
propose to dispute "at this tyme or at any other tyme."112 In short, Hake touches
on some great issues. Though most of his discussion is bland and somewhat
diffuse, he could not avoid skating up to the hardest kind of questions, which
lay embedded in the center of his subject.
The real difficulty was that Hake, like others among his contemporaries, was
afflicted with a fatal indecision. The common lawyers had become familiar with
"equity," conceived as a principle of interpretation and usable by common law
courts. Indeed, Hake devotes one of his three dialogues to this equity which is
"within" the common law--directing decisions according to spirit rather than
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letter, searching out true intent, and fulfilling without contradicting the law's
real purposes. This was the emphasis in Aristotle's famous definition of
epieikeia, on which Hake relies not only for his title but for a whole branch of
his argument. 3 When equity of this type happened to be associated with the
"law of nature which is reason" or the law of God, the coincidence was fortu-
nate, but its function was still to search out the "soul and spirit" of the law
itself. Such a version of equity could not really explain the central facts that
were spread over the English landscape: a set of Chancery remedies that
operated in direct contradiction to specific rules of the common law, to their
policies and purposes, and to their "soul and spirit." Equity viewed merely as
a principle of interpretation could not explain an equity that depended solely
on the Chancellor's own conscience, nor could it explain how the Chancellor's
equity could take account of circumstances that were "withowte or beside the
case" and that indeed "the lawmaker" would not have been willing to consider
even if he had foreseen them. 4 Hake tries to make it appear throughout that
the Chancellor's equity and the common lawyer's equity were essentially the
same, but any practitioner who had appeared before the two sets of courts
knew well they were profoundly different. On this key issue Hake's discussion
can only be described as evasive. His conclusion that there is no real con-
tradiction between Chancery and common law because Chancery acts "ad per-
sonam and not ad rem" is a transparent evasion, although it has acquired a
kind of tawdry respectability through later centuries of repetition.
The lawyers of the late sixteenth century were confronted with the grim
alternatives either of conceding that "the law of nature which is reason" had
an unlimited mandate to rewrite the inherited common law or of attributing
the innovations of the Chancery to the political authority of the Crown. They
were unwilling to do either, though certainly the attribution to a political source
was to become very common within two decades. Hake does concede at one
point that the authority of the Chancery depended on the "absolute power of
the Prince."5 But then he adds that "much mighte be sayde of this matter, and
even nowe while I have bine speaking unto yow many things have come to
my remembraunce, but I must forebeare them all." ' How true it was that much
might be said of this matter. Some fifty years later a revolution was fought
over this matter and then for another 300 years much more has been said con-
cerning it. Yet the innovations of the Chancery could surely not have occurred
without the overmastering power of the Crown or without a political theory that
justified, indeed demanded, the intervention of political authority to realize
:,equity," "conscience," and "the law of God." It is surprising to find in the
interesting preface to this volume by Professor Samuel Thorne a sharp denial
of the suggestion that the Chancellor historically acted "for the Prince, was
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pended solely upon the prerogative and was a prerogative court-the court of
the king's absolute power." 7 Perhaps the crucial word in this passage is "sole-
ly." It was precisely to avoid the "sole" dependence on royal power that Hake
and other diligent authors wrote their treatises. The problem was to find a
frame of ideas that had some authority other than that supplied by the Queen's
militia and the trained bands. In this search it cannot be said that Hake was
any more successful than other contemporary writers. His account of the
common lawyers' "equity" is good, since it rests on the recorded experience of
those first class minds which had been working over the common lawyers'
heritage for centuries. His account of the Chancellor's epuity is sketchy and
uninformative, and on the crucial issues evasive and unconvincing.
The great disappointment of Hake's treatise is referred to by the editor in
his introduction. Hake is almost entirely silent on subjects that would be most
helpful to us now-the developing doctrines and the specific solutions of the
late Elizabethan Chancery. The court was very active, its records were (and
are) in excellent and most usable condition. Hake himself must have seen the
Chancellor's equity at work in very concrete ways. Yet he tells us nothing,
just as the contemporary reports of Chancery cases tell us almost nothing of
what the Chancellor was really doing, and why.
On all the charges that can be levelled against Hake, one can readily excuse
him. It was hard for anyone basking in the slanting Indian summer sun of the
last years of Elizabeth to raise the dangerous question of her Chancellor's au-
thority. It was much harder for a lawyer to undertake a strictly lawyer's job
on the Chancery, to organize and classify and correlate the manifold, dispersed
activities of the sixteenth century Chancery. This did not mean that the
remedies employed by the Chancellor had been directly transported to England
from some Elysian fields or that the Chancellor considered himself the agent of
an omnipresent law of nature. The Chancellor's work was firmly rooted in
robust common sense, and to an amazing extent it enlisted the good sense and
the consciences of English laymen-solid citizens, stable and sober men, not
visionaries at all. But to organize the results of common sense into a body of
intelligible doctrine was too great a task for Hake, the mayor and steward of
Windsor, minor satirist and poet. He can hardly be blamed for postponing
work that was to take 200 years.
The preface to the present edition, by Professor Thorne, is, as one would
expect, wise and well-informed. The general editor of the series published for
the Yale Law Library by the Yale University Press reveals his complete famili-
arity with the legal literature of the period. There is also an Introduction of
seventeen pages by the editor, D. E. C. Yale, and this adds to the interest and
value of the edition. The work of publication is carefully done. It will preserve
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